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DISABILITY ADVOCACY AND ATKINS
James W. Ellis*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,1 which
prohibited imposition of the death penalty upon defendants with
mental retardation, has been widely discussed in the context of capital
litigation and Eighth Amendment doctrine.2 Such analysis is both ap-
propriate and important, because Atkins represents a major doctrinal
development in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence. But Atkins
also represents a significant development in disability law.3 In the de-
cades before Atkins, the Court grappled with a number of constitu-
* Henry Weihofen Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. Professor Ellis represented
the petitioner in Atkins and has represented national disability organizations as amici in a num-
ber of cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, including several discussed in this Article. He also
served as President of the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), which has
recently been renamed the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabili-
ties (AAIDD).
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins
v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications
of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811 (2007); Elizabeth
Rapaport, Straight is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33
N.M. L. REV. 349 (2003); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the
Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005).
See also Bill Kurtis, Clarence Darrow Keynote Address at the DePaul Law Review Symposium:
Atkins v. Virginia: Protecting a National Moral Consensus (Mar. 9, 2007), in 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
643 (2008): Andrea D. Lyon, But He Doesn't Look Retarded: Challenges to Capital Jury Selec-
tion for the Mentally Retarded Client Not Excluded Under Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
701 (2008); Ajitha L. Reddy, Eugenic Origins of IQ Testing: Implications for Post-Atkins Litiga-
tion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 667 (2008); Maria Sandys et al., Taking Account of the "Diminished
Capacities of the Retarded": Are Capital Jurors up to the Task?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 679 (2008);
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure
in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 (2008); Bryan
Stevenson, Effect of Atkins Below the Mason-Dixon Line, Address at the DePaul Law Review
Symposium: Atkins v. Virginia: Protecting a National Moral Consensus (Mar. 9, 2007), in 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (2008). For a discussion of the legislative issues arising in the implementa-
tion of Atkins, see James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (Jan.-Feb. 2003).
3. For example, it provided important doctrinal support for the Court's decision in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552-53 (2005) (banning the imposition of the death penalty on defend-
ants who were juveniles at the time of their offense). Atkins has also been cited in the context of
mitigation evidence regarding other forms of mental disability. See, e.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (discussing the use of a defendant's low IQ as mitigating evidence).
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tional and statutory issues involving citizens with mental disabilities.
During this period, the Court's perception of the nature of mental re-
tardation had a dramatic impact on the resolution of the constitutional
issues.
This Article examines the correlation between the Court's percep-
tion and its resolution of the constitutional issues, most dramatically
exhibited in Atkins. Part II of this Article briefly examines the history
of discrimination against persons with mental retardation. 4 Part III of
this Article traces the history of the Court's decisions involving per-
sons with mental retardation, giving special attention to the way in
which the Justices' opinions reveal their apparent understanding of
mental retardation and the relationship between individuals who have
the disability and the law. 5 Finally, Part IV addresses the Atkins opin-
ion itself, with emphasis on the Court's understanding of mental
retardation. 6
II. A LEGACY OF DISCRIMINATION AND CONFINEMENT
The mistreatment of individuals with mental retardation is one of
the darker chapters in our nation's history. This history is marked by
severe restrictions on personal liberty that can be traced to mispercep-
tions, stereotypes, and fears that were prominent at the time. Indeed,
five Justices have described our nation's treatment of citizens with
mental retardation as "grotesque."'7
The earliest chapters of that history included, along with fiscal and
public safety issues, an admixture of charitable motivations. 8 While
individuals with mental retardation were not exactly embraced by
their communities, there was a concern that they receive proper care.9
But, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, any such al-
truistic impulse was largely overwhelmed and supplanted by policies
reflecting fear and antipathy. There was a widespread belief, often
promoted by prominent individuals in the field of mental disability,
4. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 14-77 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
7. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the treatment as "a lengthy and tragic history of segregation and discrimination that
can only be called grotesque" (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
8. See, e.g., SAMUEL GRIDLEY HOWE, ON THE CAUSES OF IDIOCY (Arno Press 1972) (1858);
EDWARD JARVIS, INSANITY AND IDIOCY IN MASSACHUSETTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
LUNACY, 1855 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1855); see also DAVID GOLLAHER, VOICE FOR THE
MAD: THE LIFE OF DOROTHEA Dix 141-82 (1995).
9. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT, JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL
RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES 40-59 (1994).
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that persons with mental retardation pose a major threat to society.
In part, those with intellectual disabilities were perceived as creating
an intolerable drain on society's resources for their care, criminality,
and a wide array of other social ills.
The role that anticipated criminality of persons with mental retarda-
tion played in this movement is particularly striking. For example,
Lewis M. Terman, a prominent leader in the field of mental disability
and one of the developers of early intelligence tests, argued the
following:
The feeble-minded ... [are] by definition a burden rather than an
asset, not only economically but still more because of their tenden-
cies to become delinquent or criminal. To provide them with costly
instruction for a few years, and then to turn them loose upon society
as soon as they are ripe for reproduction and crime, can hardly be
accepted as an ultimate solution of the problem. The only effective
way to deal with the hopelessly feeble-minded is by permanent cus-
todial care.' 0
With warnings about criminality as a central argument, eugenics advo-
cates had great success in alarming the public and influencing public
policy in the early decades of the twentieth century. The public policy
goals pursued by this alarmist movement involved eugenic steriliza-
tion and lifelong segregation of individuals who had mental retarda-
tion.1 The eugenicists' successes left a morally indefensible legacy of
involuntary sterilizations 2 and a public services system dominated by
large residential institutions, whose founding purpose and continuing
function was to segregate individuals with disabilities from their com-
munities. 13 It was against this backdrop that the Court began its in-
volvement in the lives of individuals with mental retardation.
10. LEWIS M. TERMAN, THE INTELLIGENCE OF SCHOOL CHILDREN: How CHILDREN DIFFER
IN ABILITY, THE USE OF MENTAL TESTS IN SCHOOL GRADING AND THE PROPER EDUCATION OF
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 132-33 (1919); see generally NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN
CRIMINALS 55-72 (1997).
11. See, e.g., Harry H. Laughlin, The Eugenical Sterilization of the Feeble-minded, 31 J.
PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 210, 211 (1926) ("In any given case, when a potential source of producing
feeble-minded offspring is located, it is the duty, and it should be the purpose of the state to
prevent reproduction.").
12. See generally EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA'S
CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (2003); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGEN-
ICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY (1985).
13. See TRENT, JR., supra note 9, at 96-130; WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE ORIGIN AND NA-
TURE OF OUR INSTITUTIONAL MODELS (1975); David Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institu-
tional History of Disability, in DISABILITY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE STATE
OF THE STATES 3 (David Braddock ed., 2002).
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III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S MENTAL DISABILITY CASES
This Part discusses the Court's major cases involving mental retar-
dation prior to Atkins: Buck v. Bell,14 Jackson v. Indiana,15 Young-
blood v. Romeo, 16 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,17 and
Penry v. Lynaugh.18
A. Buck v. Bell
The Court first addressed mental retardation in Buck v. Bell.' 9 In
that well-known case, the Court upheld the involuntary sterilization of
Carrie Buck, an inmate at the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and
Feebleminded, rejecting constitutional challenges to Virginia's 1924
eugenic sterilization statute.20 Although the Court of that era had
shown little reticence in striking down state laws in other contexts, 21
the eugenics statute was held to be constitutional.22 With only one
Justice dissenting,23 the Court rejected challenges based on both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24
But the Court's holding was less remarkable than the startling lan-
guage Justice Holmes used to characterize people with mental retar-
dation. Justice Holmes began by describing Carrie Buck as "a feeble
minded white woman" who was "the daughter of a feeble minded
mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate fee-
ble minded child."' 25 Holmes then unfavorably contrasted Buck with
Americans injured during military service:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
14. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
19. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). There is a growing body of literature discussing the background and
legal reasoning of the Buck opinion. See, e.g., HARRY BRUINIUS, BETTER FOR ALL THE WORLD:
THE SECRET HISTORY OF FORCED STERILIZATION AND AMERICA'S QUEST FOR RACIAL PURITY
50-77 (2006); J. DAVID SMITH & K. RAY NELSON, THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (1989);
Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331 (1985).
20. Buck, 274 U.S at 207-08.
21. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Buck, 274 U.S at 208.
23. Id. (Butler, J., dissenting without an opinion).
24. Id. at 205 (majority opinion).
25. Id. The factual premise about Buck and her family has been persuasively debunked. See,
e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 30 (1985).
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sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to
prevent our being swamped with incompetence.26
Holmes then followed this confident declaration that persons with
mental retardation were invariably a burden on society with an
equally confident conclusion that, solely because of their mental disa-
bilities, they were doomed to commit capital crimes:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degener-
ate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough.27
The Court's opinion in Buck could hardly be clearer in its dispar-
agement of citizens with mental retardation.28 Its tone is grudging in
acknowledging the possibility that they were entitled to anything from
society at all, much less any claim to equal citizenship. The Court in
Buck viewed people with mental retardation in the most negative light
imaginable. In the eight decades since Buck, the Court has never
overruled it.
B. Jackson v. Indiana
The next major case involving an individual with mental retardation
came two generations later. During the intervening decades mental
retardation professionals completely rejected eugenic sterilization and
increasingly debated the service system's focus on confinement and
care in large residential institutions.29
In Jackson v. Indiana, Theon Jackson was accused of two counts of
petty robbery (with a combined "take" of nine dollars), but the trial
court found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him to an
institution until such time as he might regain his competence. 30 In a
unanimous opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court held that
Jackson was entitled to commitment procedures equivalent to those
26. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
28. It is noteworthy that the opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, while reach-
ing the same conclusion about the constitutionality of the statute, refrained from any similarly
incendiary rhetoric. See Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516 (Va. 1925).
29. See TRENT, JR., supra note 13, at 225-68 (1994); Braddock & Parish, supra note 13, at
34-41. For a discussion of the role of litigation in advancing those changes, see DAVID J. ROTH-
MAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984). For a view of these develop-
ments in a single state, see OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT: NEBRASKA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION (Robert L. Schalock & David L. Braddock eds.,
2002).
30. 406 U.S. 715, 717, 719 (1972).
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ensured by Indiana's law for civil commitment cases and to have "the
nature and duration of [his] commitment bear some reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which the individual is committed. '31
For purposes of this Article, the most significant aspect of the Jack-
son opinion is the Court's tone in describing Jackson's disability. Jack-
son was described as "a mentally defective deaf mute with a mental
level of a pre-school child."'32 The Court cited a medical report from
Jackson's competency hearing that "concluded that Jackson's almost
nonexistent communication skill, together with his lack of hearing and
his mental deficiency, left him unable to understand the nature of the
charges against him or to participate in his defense. ' 33 Even though
the case involved a criminal prosecution, the tone of alarmism and
impatience with claims of constitutional rights that dominated Justice
Holmes's opinion in Buck had been replaced with something more
akin to sympathy and solicitude: "The record also fails to establish
that Jackson is in need of custodial care or 'detention.' He has been
employed at times, and there is no evidence that the care he long re-
ceived at home has become inadequate. ' 34 The Court invalidated the
Indiana statute, because it "condemn[ed] him in effect to permanent
institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or
the opportunity for release" afforded to those in the civil system. 35
Rather than expressing disdain for claims of constitutional rights by
persons with mental disabilities, the Court appeared to invite more
cases that would present opportunities to evaluate those claims. 36
C. Youngberg v. Romeo
The Court's next consideration of the constitutional rights of those
with mental retardation came a decade later in Youngberg v. Romeo.37
In the interim, the Justices had occasion to consider the*constitutional
claims of an individual said to have mental illness 38 and the statutory
rights of a class of individuals confined to a mental retardation institu-
tion. 39 The Court was also aware of the substantial body of class ac-
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id. at 717.
33. Id. at 718.
34. Id. at 728.
35. Id. at 730.
36. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 737 ("Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps re-
markable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more fre-
quently litigated.").
37. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
38. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1975).
39. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1. 6 (1981).
[Vol. 57:653
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tion litigation in the lower courts concerning conditions in mental
retardation institutions.40 That litigation had brought to light egre-
gious violations of the most minimal standards of care and human de-
cency in institutions that had been created originally for eugenic
segregation. 41
Unlike earlier class actions, Romeo was an individual lawsuit for
damages brought on behalf of an individual institutionalized at Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital, a large residential facility in Penn-
sylvania.42 Romeo had argued that he was entitled to compensation
for violations of his constitutional rights, including the right to free-
dom from unnecessary confinement (in the form of physical re-
straints) and the right to minimally adequate training or habilitation. 43
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled in Romeo's
favor,44 and the Court, with concurring opinions but without dissent,
agreed that Romeo was entitled to a new trial, albeit with a substan-
tially narrower definition of his constitutional rights.45
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, described the plaintiff in
terms that suggested a substantial and incapacitating level of disabil-
ity: "Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although
33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child, with
an I.Q. between 8 and 10. He cannot talk and lacks the most basic
self-care skills."'46 The Court emphasized Romeo's mother's inability
to care for him at home47 and appeared to accept as indisputable that
Romeo was incapable of living outside of an institution like Pen-
nhurst.48 The Court focused on the potential harm that an individual
could suffer because of mistreatment in an institution.49
40. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, remanded in
part, and rev'd in part, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); N.Y. State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); see generally ROTH-
MAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 29.
41. See generally David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman, The Litigator as Reformer, in
MENTAL RETARDATION IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL READER 445-65 (Steven Noll & James W.
Trent, Jr. eds., 2004).
42. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 310-11.
43. Id. at 309.
44. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc).
45. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 324-25.
46. Id. at 309.
47. Id.
48. Id. The Court's assumption that Romeo could not live in the community was factually
incorrect. Nicholas Romeo was living successfully in a group home in Philadelphia within a few
years of the Court's decision. John Woestendiek, The Deinstitutionalization of Nicholas Romeo,
INQUIRER: THE PHILA. INQUIRER MAG., May 27, 1984, at 18.
49. The Court's understanding of this peril was almost certainly informed by its earlier consid-
eration of the class action from the same institution in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman:
2008] 659
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The Romeo opinion portrayed an individual with very substantial
limitations in his functioning as a potential victim of mistreatment by a
state institution. It is noteworthy that the Court explicitly held that
neither the lawfulness of his commitment nor, implicitly, the severity
of his intellectual disability prevented enforcement of liberty "inter-
ests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish.
50
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan
and O'Connor, went even further in recognizing that the facility may
have violated the constitutional rights of its inmates by failing to pre-
vent the atrophy of skills caused by institutionalization. 51
D. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
The Court's next major ruling involving persons with mental retar-
dation came three terms later in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.52 The plaintiff brought an equal protection challenge against a
city ordinance that effectively excluded group homes for persons with
mental retardation from substantial areas of the city.53 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the ordinance and held that
individuals with mental retardation constituted a protected class enti-
tled to intermediate scrutiny of laws alleged to discriminate against
the class. 54 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
mental retardation was a condition that appropriately triggered inter-
mediate scrutiny but, while purporting to employ a rational basis stan-
dard, overturned the city's exclusion of the group home.55
Justice White's majority opinion rejected the intermediate scrutiny
standard:
[The District Court's] findings of fact are undisputed: Conditions at Pennhurst are not
only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff mem-
bers, but also inadequate for the "habilitation" of the retarded. Indeed, the court
found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some residents have deteri-
orated at Pennhurst.
451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981). The Court had also had occasion to express skepticism about the conditions
at an institution for the treatment of mental illness. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
567, 569 ("The evidence showed that Donaldson's confinement was a simple regime of enforced
custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.").
50. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 315.
51. Id. at 329 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Il respondent possessed certain basic self-care
skills when he entered the institution, and was sufficiently educable that he could have main-
tained those skills with a certain degree of training, then I would be prepared to listen seriously
to an argument that petitioners were constitutionally required to provide that training .....
52. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
53. Id. at 436-37.
54. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. v. City of Cleburne. 726 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1984).
55. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 450.
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[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguish-
ing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to
implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in
our federal system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
ers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and
to what extent those interests should be pursued. 56
Justice White also noted several attributes of individuals with mental
retardation that, in the majority's opinion, made intermediate scrutiny
inappropriate, including differences within the class of persons who
have mental retardation. 57 Individuals with mental retardation are "a
large and diversified group," who are not "all cut from the same pat-
tern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from those
whose disability is not immediately evident to those who must be con-
stantly cared for."5 8
The second reason offered by the majority was the existence of be-
nevolent and assistive legislation:
[T]he distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the
plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only
that they have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have
been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continu-
ing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intru-
sive oversight by the judiciary.59
The Court stated that this legislation "reflects the real and undeniable
differences between the retarded and others,"'60 in particular, "that
those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with
and function in the everyday world." '6'
Justice Marshall's concurring and dissenting opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun, was even more emphatic in the sympa-
thy it evidenced for those with mental retardation. 62 The opinion
detailed the nation's history of eugenic sterilization, segregation, and
denial of basic civil liberties and concluded that Cleburne's ordinance
and laws like it are a legacy of that earlier history and should be sub-
jected to more than minimal judicial scrutiny. 63
Perhaps the clearest indication of the evolution of the Court's per-
ception of mental retardation was the Court's unanimous decision to
overturn the exclusion of the group home by the city. The Court be-
56. Id. at 441-42.
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 443.
60. Id. at 444.
61. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
62. Id. at 455-78 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id.
2008]
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gan by acknowledging that persons with mental retardation "as a
group are indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune"
but determined that the motive of the city was to acquiesce to objec-
tions by the home's neighbors. 64 Noting that "mere negative atti-
tudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding are not permissible bases" for ex-
cluding the group home.65 The Court observed that, while "'[pirivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law ... the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.'" 66 The Court's opinion in Cleburne,
although largely disappointing to advocates for individuals with
mental retardation, 67 clearly reflected an evolving understanding of
the disability that bears almost no resemblance to the views expressed
in Buck.68
E. Penry v. Lynaugh
It was against this backdrop that the Court first considered mental
retardation in the context of capital punishment. In Penry v. Lynaugh,
the Court was asked to declare the death penalty unconstitutional for
offenders with mental retardation. 69 Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its such executions, but the Court vacated Penry's death sentence on
the grounds that the sentencing jury had been given an inadequate
opportunity to consider the mitigating significance of his mental disa-
bility.70 In the Court's view, jurors may have concluded that Penry
64. Id. at 448 (majority opinion).
65. Id.
66. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429. 433 (1984)).
67. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 114-20 (1990); 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 7.22 (1st ed. 1989); James W. Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications, 3
CONST. COMMENT. 375 (1986). Advocates' disappointment about Cleburne's failure to provide
more generalized constitutional protection for people with mental retardation was compounded
when, in Heller v. Doe, the Court failed to require civil commitment procedures comparable to
those afforded to individuals with mental illness. 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993).
68. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text. Cleburne was the first of the constitutional
cases in this series in which the Court received extensive amicus curiae briefing from organiza-
tions in the field of mental retardation.
69. 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989).
70. Id. at 340. The Penry decision involved two separate five-Justice coalitions. Justice
O'Connor was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall. Blackmun, and Stevens in holding that
Penry was entitled to a new sentencing procedure. Id. at 302. She was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy in rejecting the claim for categorical exclu-
sion of defendants with mental retardation from the death penalty. Id. The latter majority's
rejection of the Eighth Amendment claim rested, in large part, on the Court's perception that
there was, at that time, inadequate evidence of a national consensus against the practice. Id. at
333-35. The subsequent adoption of legislation by sixteen additional states banning the death
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was "less able than a normal adult to control his impulses or to evalu-
ate the consequences of his conduct," given the inadequate mitigation
instruction and that Penry was mentally retarded. 71 Justice O'Connor
then observed that "Penry's mental retardation and history of abuse is
thus a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blameworthiness for his
crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be
dangerous in the future. '72
On whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of indi-
viduals with mental retardation, Justice O'Connor rejected the
"mental age" analogy, noting that comparisons between adults with
mental retardation and mentally typical children were imprecise.73
Addressing intellectual impairment directly, the Court noted "that
mental retardation has long been regarded as a factor that may dimin-
ish an individual's culpability for a criminal act."'74 But Justice
O'Connor added the following:
On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot conclude
that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability-by virtue of
their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized
consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of
culpability associated with the death penalty .... In addition to the
varying degrees of mental retardation, the consequences of a re-
tarded person's mental impairment, including the deficits in his or
her adaptive behavior, may be ameliorated through education and
habilitation. 75
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, while agreeing with Justice O'Connor's basic factual description,
disagreed as to its application to the Eighth Amendment issue: "I
cannot agree that the undeniable fact that mentally retarded persons
penalty for defendants with mental retardation was a central feature of the Atkins Court's ratio-
nale for overturning of that portion of Penry. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002).
71. Penry, 492 U.S. at 322.
72. Id. at 324. In later cases, the Court insisted that the state could not evade its duty to offer
a full opportunity for considering the mitigating effect of mental retardation evidence or of evi-
dence of other mental impairments. Penry v. Johnson (Penry 11), 532 U.S. 782, 800 (2001); Ten-
nard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004). On the relevant attributes of individuals, like Tennard,
with mental impairments that may not satisfy the definition of mental retardation, see THE FOR-
GOTTEN GENERATION: THE STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF ADULTS WITH MILD COGNITIVE LIM-
ITATIONS (Alexander J. Tymchuk et al. eds., 2001).
73. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339-40. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Romeo Court, in characteriz-
ing the level of disability experienced by Nicholas Romeo, described him in terms of his sup-
posed mental age. "Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child,
with an I.Q. between 8 and 10." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982). See supra notes
30 and 48 and accompanying text.
74. Penry, 492 U.S. at 337.
75. Id. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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have diverse capacities and life experiences is of significance" to the
constitutionality of the death penalty for individuals in the group.
76
Justice Brennan's opinion concluded that every individual with the
disability was sufficiently impaired to make the death penalty consti-
tutionally inappropriate. 77
IV. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
As noted above,78 the principal change that occurred between the
Court's consideration of Penry and Atkins was the enactment of statu-
tory prohibitions on executing defendants with mental retardation in
sixteen additional states. But the Atkins Court's opinion, authored by
Justice Stevens, supplemented this additional evidence of a national
consensus with the Court's own view of the culpability issue: "Our
independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with
the judgment of the legislatures that have recently addressed the mat-
ter and concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a men-
tally retarded criminal."' 79 Further, although the Court acknowledged
that the impairment caused by mental retardation is not total and that
individuals with the disability are not identical to one another, it con-
cluded that there were relevant attributes shared by all members of
the class:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between
right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their
impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capaci-
ties to understand and process information, to communicate, to ab-
stract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others.80
76. Id. at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
77. Id. at 348. Justice Stevens, who would later author the Court's opinion in Atkins, and
Justice Blackmun reached the same conclusion. Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
78. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 318. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, objected
to this conclusion:
Is there an established correlation between mental acuity and the ability to conform
one's conduct to the law in such a rudimentary matter as murder? Are the mentally
retarded really more disposed (and hence more likely) to commit willfully cruel and
serious crime than others? In my experience, the opposite is true: being childlike gen-
erally suggests innocence rather than brutality.
Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Court then went out of its way to deny that mental retardation
rendered individuals prone to criminality but noted that shared attrib-
utes made the death penalty unacceptable:
There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal
conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often
act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and
that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their
deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions,
but they do diminish their personal culpability.81
Justice Stevens's opinion also raised an issue not previously dis-
cussed in the Court's mental disability decisions: the likelihood that
defendants who have mental retardation are at increased risk of
wrongful conviction. 82
The reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provides a sec-
ond justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligi-
ble for the death penalty .... Mentally retarded defendants may be
less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typi-
cally poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwar-
ranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes .... Mentally
retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.83
This language clearly shows that the majority's concern about the po-
tential for a miscarriage of justice was influenced by its increased un-
derstanding of the realities involved in capital prosecutions of
individuals with mental retardation.
The Court's understanding of the realities of the lives of individuals
with disabilities is a work in progress, but Atkins stands in contrast to
other decisions in which the interests of persons with disabilities were
treated with considerably less sympathy.84 When viewed in light of
the Court cases preceding it, Atkins represents significant progress in
the Court's recognition of the realities of mental disability.
81. Id. at 318 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 320-21.
83. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court appeared to be alluding
to the wrongful convictions of Earl Washington, Jr. in Virginia and Anthony Porter in Illinois.
See generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL
WASHINGTON, JR. (2003); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT 160-61 (2003).
84. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to state defendants). See generally RUTH
COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILI-
TIES ACT (2005).
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V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Atkins cannot be fully under-
stood without considering its place in the development of mental disa-
bility law. In the preceding three decades, the Court had considered a
number of cases involving individuals with mental retardation. The
Court's decisions have not all been favorable to the rights of people
with disabilities, nor have the characterizations of individuals with
mental retardation been completely consistent. However, it is clear
that the Court's understanding of mental retardation has moved sub-
stantially beyond the hostile mindset so clearly evidenced in Buck v.
Bell.
